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INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 20o8, federal immigration authorities arrested and jailed
Cheikh Diop, a Senegalese national, after serving him with a Notice to Appear
in immigration court. The government subsequently incarcerated Diop for two
years and eleven months while it sought to remove him from the United States.'
Diop's Kafkaesque journey through the immigration system ultimately led to
"1072 days of detention, four rulings by an immigration judge, three rulings by
the [Board of Immigration Appeals], a state court ruling on [a prior drug] con-
viction and a subsequent pending appeal to the intermediate state court, a rul-
ing by a federal district court judge on his habeas petition, and an appeal to [the
Third Circuit]," all of which occurred while he was behind bars.' Eventually,
the government conceded that Diop had a statutory right to remain in the
United States and released him from custody.
Amadou Lamine Diouf, also a native of Senegal, shares a similar story. Im-
migration authorities sent Diouf, a Seattle resident, to a Southern California jail
as the government pursued a removal order.' Like Diop, Dioufs experience
with American courts was convoluted. Two separate panels of the Ninth Circuit
considered appeals from district court habeas proceedings and a third panel re-
viewed his immigration case.4 Nearly two years after Dioufs arrest, a federal
court ordered the government to provide Diouf a bond hearing. After an immi-
gration judge found that he neither posed a threat to public safety nor presented
a flight risk from the jurisdiction of the immigration court, the government re-
leased Diouf from prison.' Five years later, after several rounds of litigation in
the Ninth Circuit, the government agreed to terminate removal proceedings
against Diouf.6
The government detained both Diop and Diouf for a prolonged period of
time, without securing a criminal conviction, in the nation's immigration de-
tention system.7 This system is vast: in fiscal year 2011, the United States gov-
1. Since 1996, "removal" has been the proper legal term for what many people collo-
quially call "deportation." Removal orders can be issued either because the nonci-
tizen is inadmissible or deportable. For a helpful discussion of this vocabulary,
and the 1996 changes to the legal definitions of these words, see United States v.
Ventura-Candelario, 981 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
2. Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 221-26 (3d Cir. 2011).
3. Dioufv. Napolitano, 634 F.3d o8i (9th Cir. 2011).
4. See id.; Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 20o8); Diouf v. Holder, No 06-
73991 (9th Cir. docketed Aug. 15, 2006).
5. Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1083-84.
6. Order, Diouf No. 06-73991, ECF. No. u6.
7. I define immigration detention as any confinement-actual or constructive-
occurring either during administrative removal proceedings (and judicial review
of such proceedings) or related to a final and unreviewable judicial order. This in-
cludes any detention purportedly authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012).
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ernment admitted 429,247 individuals to immigration detention.' Though the
majority of immigration detainees spend far less time in prison than Diop and
Diouf,9 lengthy immigration detention is not uncommon. A research report
analyzing a snapshot of the immigration detainee population on a single day
found that on January 25, 2009 at least 4,170 people-and possibly more-had
been held in immigration detention for over six months.o Some 1,334 of those
individuals had been confined for over a year, and, in one extreme case, an in-
dividual had spent fifteen years in prison." Moreover, the economic cost of this
vast system is great: in 2012, the federal government spent over $i.8 billion on
immigration detention." By any metric, the immigration detention system is
impressive in size and scope.
Immigration detention is authorized by a complex statutory and regulatory
scheme. With one notable exception, the Supreme Court has largely upheld the
system that Congress has designed, bowing to traditional congressional primacy
in the regulation of immigration. 3 The Court has relied on the plenary power
doctrine-an extratextual, judicially created doctrine granting the political
branches great deference in the immigration sphere-to sustain our nation's
present immigration detention system.'4
This Note proposes an alternative legal model of immigration detention.
Instead of a theory marked by judicial deference to Congress and the President,
I advance a constitutionalized theory of immigration detention. I confine my
argument to the structure of judicial review of administrative detention deter-
minations-that is, how the federal courts should review the immigration en-
forcement officials' and administrative adjudicators' decisions to detain a non-
8. John Simanski & Lesley M. Sapp, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2011, U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 5 tbl.4 (Sept. 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement ar_2ou.pdf. In 2012, the
average daily population of immigration detainees was 34,000 individuals. U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
SALARIES AND ExPENSES 37 (2012). Over 200 detention facilities house immigra-
tion detainees. Id. at 36-37.
9. The average length of stay in detention for all immigration detainees subject to
mandatory detention was 34.7 days in fiscal year 2011. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEARS 2011-2013, at 22 (2012) [he-
reinafter DHS, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT].
10. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Prolonged Immigration Detention of Individuals Who
Are Challenging Removal 4 (2009), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/prolonged
_detention issue brief.pdf.
n1. Id.
12. DHS, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 66. The Department re-
quested nearly $2 billion dollars to run "custody operations," i.e., the immigrant
detention system, for fiscal year 2013. Id.
13. See infra Section I.C.
14. See infra Section I.A.
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citizen during the pendency of immigration proceedings or the execution of a
removal order. I draw on constitutional text and principles as well as contem-
porary and historical judicial practice to envision the contours of a system of
constitutionalized judicial review of immigration detention.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the plenary power doc-
trine, reviews its doctrinal limitations and academic criticisms, and describes
how the modern Court has largely upheld our present immigration detention
system on the basis of the plenary power doctrine. The remaining Parts are ded-
icated to exploring a constitutionalized theory of immigration detention. Part II
presents the historical and doctrinal basis for such a theory. Parts III and IV ex-
amine the implications of constitutionalizing immigration detention for man-
datory and permissive immigration detention, respectively. Part V compares the
federal courts' current methods for reviewing immigration detention with the
constitutional protections I advance in the preceding parts.
I. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE AND IMMIGRATION DETENTION
A. The Origin of the Plenary Power Doctrine
Despite the Constitution's notable near silence on the subject," immigra-
tion engendered one of the nation's first constitutional crises. Fearful of "the
importation of dangerous revolutionary ideas from France," 6 the Federalists, in
control of Congress and the White House, proposed the Alien and Sedition Acts
in 1798.17 The debates surrounding the legislation brought to light the Founding
generation's lack of consensus on the source of the nation's power to regulate
immigration. President Adams's Federalists asserted that noncitizens were not
15. The word "migration" does appear in the Constitution once, in the Migration and
Importation Clause, which dealt only with involuntary migration as a slave and
(perhaps) the migration of indentured servants. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; see
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and
Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L. REV. 743, 785 (1996). In short order, however, Fed-
eralists would come to cite the Migration Clause as support for the federal gov-
ernment's authority over general immigration in early debates surrounding vol-
untary immigration. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG., at 1957-58 (1798) (statement of
Samuel Sewall).
16. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, ioo YALE L.J. 909, 927 (1991). The Alien
and Sedition Acts were little more than a proxy for a larger political fight between
President Adams's Federalists and Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-Republicans.
See id. at 928.
17. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23); Alien
Act (or Alien Friends Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired June 25, 1800); Sedi-
tion Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired Mar. 3, 1801); Naturalization Act, ch. 54,
1 Stat. 566 (1798) (repealed 1802); see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sov-
ereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1, 87-99 (2002); Neuman, supra note 16,
at 927-39.
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parties to the Constitution and could not claim protections from it, while ar-
guing that the law of nations endowed the federal government with the right to
expel unwanted noncitizens." The Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans be-
lieved that the Constitution conferred at least some protections onto nonciti-
zens, with some going so far as to claim that the states-not the federal gov-
ernment-had the authority to expel noncitizens from their territory.'9 The
contentious discourse around the Alien and Sedition Acts portends the late
nineteenth-century development of the plenary power doctrine, which upholds
federal primacy, while also illustrating that the Founding generation did not
agree on the proper relationship between the federal government and the Con-
stitution when it came to regulating immigration.
Gerald Neuman has chronicled the "lost century" of immigration law, con-
vincingly showing that states provided the bulk of immigration regulation from
the demise of the Alien and Sedition Acts through the Civil War, even while the
federal government continued to shape at least some aspects of the nation's
immigration policy.2o Similarly, Supreme Court decisions from this era reflect
an uncertain conception of the ultimate distribution of the regulatory authority
over the nation's borders. Early state regulation schemes were mostly upheld,
but as the country grew so too did the federal government's authority to clamp
down on unwanted state interference with migration.'
18. See Cleveland, supra note 17, at 90-95; Neuman, supra note 16, at 929-34.
19. Albert Gallatin, who would become President Jefferson's Secretary of Treasury,
emphasized the constitutional protections conferred on "aliens" as opposed to
"citizens." 8 ANNALS OF CONG., at 1981 (1798). Although this view may not have
been dominant even among Jeffersonians, John Taylor, addressing the Virginia
House of Delegates, suggested that the Constitution required the government to
afford noncitizens judicial process before expulsion. Debate on Virginia Resolu-
tions, in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDI-
TION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798,
THE DEBATE AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIR-
GINIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REPORT AND
RESOLUTIONS 116 (1850) (statement of John Taylor); see Cleveland, supra note 17,
at 90-95; Neuman, supra note 16, at 934-38.
20. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833 (1993). Although at least one current Justice believes that the state regu-
lations of this era continue to serve as valid precedent permitting vigorous sub-
federal regulation today, it appears that a majority of the Court has rejected this
proposition. Compare Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511-15 (2012) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he States have the right to
protect their borders against foreign nationals."), with id. at 2510 (majority opin-
ion) ("The National Government has significant power to regulate immigra-
tion.. . . Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused
by illegal immigration while that process continues, but the State may not pursue
policies that undermine federal law.").
21. Compare Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (ii Pet.) 102 (1837) (upholding a
New York immigration regulation), with The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
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Congress increasingly turned its attention to restricting immigration fol-
lowing the Civil War. The initial emphasis was the exclusion of Asian immigra-
tion, particularly immigration from China. It is against the backdrop of these
racially charged laws that the Court developed the plenary power doctrine." In
1889, the Court considered the Chinese Exclusion Case, which challenged the
government's ability to keep a Chinese citizen out of the country pursuant to
the exclusion law targeting the Chinese, even though such exclusion was in vi-
olation of a treaty between China and the United States. Writing for the Court,
Justice Field held that because "[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a
part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its ex-
ercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the
country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any
one."23 In other words, though the country may have entered into a binding
commitment under international law, Congress's decision to subsequently ex-
clude the entry of Chinese immigrants was absolute and judicially unreviewa-
ble.
The Court continued to solidify Congress's authority over immigration
four years later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 4 In a 5-3 vote, the Court
upheld the federal government's power to detain a noncitizen prior to deporta-
tion. 5 Justice Gray, writing for the Court, first reaffirmed the Court's commit-
283 (1849) (striking down state taxes designed to discourage the flow of immi-
grants). A badly fractured Court handed down eight separate opinions in The Pas-
senger Cases, further evidence of a dissensus as to the source and extent of the fed-
eral government's authority over immigration.
22. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). Today these laws are
widely understood to have racist origins. See Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION
LAWS (1995); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (attributing
the plenary power doctrine to nineteenth-century racist practices); Louis Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty- A Century of Chinese Exclusion and
Its Progeny, loo HARV. L. REV. 853, 862-63 (1987).
23. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) ("It is a re-
ceived maxim of international law that the government of a state may prohibit the
entrance of strangers into the country, and may therefore regulate the conditions
under which they shall be allowed to remain in it, or may require and compel
their departure from it.") (quoting 1 PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, ch. 10, § 220 (3d ed. 1879)).
24. 149 U.S. 698.
25. Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Brewer, and Justice Field dissented. Justice Field was
particularly incensed by the Court's decision. See Alan Westin, Stephen J. Field
and the Headnote to O'Neil v. Vermont: A Snapshot of the Fuller Court at Work, 67
YALE L.J. 363, 380-83 (1958).
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ment to deference in the immigration arena by noting deportation "is but a me-
thod of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not com-
plied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of
the nation ... has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.""
From here, however, Fong Yue Ting went on to expand Congress's plenary au-
thority over immigration beyond the scope established in the Chinese Exclusion
Case. The Fong Yue Ting Court decreed that an "order of deportation is not pu-
nishment for a crime" and that an individual held for immigration purposes
"has not .. . been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; and the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury,
and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual pu-
nishments, have no application."" Based on these passages, Fong Yue Ting is
traditionally read both for the narrow proposition that the government may de-
tain noncitizens in "civil" immigration detention incident to the valid exercise
of the removal power and, along with the Chinese Exclusion Case, for the broad-
er proposition that Congress has wide latitude to regulate immigration without
judicial oversight.2
The plenary power doctrine did not appear out of thin air in the late nine-
teenth century; rather, the application of the plenary power doctrine to the im-
migration context fits with the Court's early understanding of Congress's au-
thority to control international affairs. Sarah Cleveland has noted that the
eighteenth-century Court applied the plenary power model to Congress's au-
thority over Native American affairs and the governance of U.S. territories as
well as to immigration regulation. 9 Moreover, Congress's exercise of full au-
thority over land acquisition and Native American affairs in the days of the ear-
ly Republic was far less politically contentious than its regulation of immigra-
tion.3 o The early Supreme Court largely upheld congressional action in each of
26. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
27. Id.; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) ("We think it
clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to
give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be val-
id.").
28. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 864-65 (1989).
29. See Cleveland, supra note 17.
30. One well-cited example is the Jefferson Administration's decision to acquire the
Louisiana territory despite Jefferson's doubts that the Constitution conferred such
authority onto the federal government. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 244
(Paul L. Ford ed., 1892); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas
(Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247-48 (Paul L. Ford
ed., 1892). Not all of his partisans shared Jefferson's doubts. Albert Gallatin, Presi-
dent Jefferson's Secretary of Treasury and a staunch Democratic-Republican, be-
lieved that "the existence of the United States as a nation presuppose(d] the power
enjoyed by every nation of extending their territory by treaties." Letter from Al-
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these realms, either on the basis of sovereign authority or by reading constitu-
tional text broadly so as to provide Congress grants of authority in these areas.3'
Moreover, as the Court moved into the twentieth century, it yoked Congress's
vast authority over immigration to a wider, twentieth-century theory of plenary
federal power to conduct foreign affairs.32 In short, Congress's plenary power
over immigration is not sui generis. Rather, it is part of a judicial tradition of re-
lying on international legal authorities and broad constructions of constitution-
al text in upholding congressional action in a number of spheres the Court un-
derstands to be not purely domestic.
B. Judicial Limitations and Scholarly Criticism
On the most aggressive reading of the plenary power doctrine, Congress
would have untrammeled and unreviewable authority to regulate all activity
concerning noncitizens in the United States. The Fuller Court itself rejected this
broad proposition in 1896, holding that Congress could not impose criminal
sanctions on an unlawfully present individual without providing the constitu-
tional protections of a trial." Over the last 125 years, the Court has handed
down numerous opinions touching upon Congress's plenary power of immi-
gration. The Court has sustained robust congressional authority over the border
bert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 13, 1803), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF AL-
BERT GALLATIN 211, 213 (E. James Ferguson ed., 1967).
31. E.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (holding that Con-
gress has unlimited jurisdiction to punish criminal conduct in Indian territory);
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840) (permitting Congress to
"make all needful rules and regulations" in the original territories "without limita-
tion"); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 531 (1832) (holding that the
Constitution conferred exclusive control over affairs with Native Americans onto
Congress); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 568-69, 572 (1823) (de-
clining to adjudicate a case concerning Native Americans because whatever au-
thority Congress had over Indian affairs derived from the law of nations); Sere v.
Pitot, 1o U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810) (permitting Congress to create territorial
courts with broader jurisdiction than Article III allowed); see Cleveland, supra
note 17, at 25-80, 163-250.
32. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-20 (1936). See
generally Cleveland, supra note 17 (discussing the relationship between nine-
teenth-century plenary powers cases and Curtiss-Wright). The larger debate sur-
rounding Curtiss-Wright, not relevant for present purposes, centers on whether
the so-called foreign affairs power is located in the executive or the legislative
branch. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, i YALE L.J. 231, 237-43 (2001).
33. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) ("[W]hen Congress sees fit
to further promote [its immigration] policy by subjecting... aliens to infamous
punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, we think such legisla-
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itself-that is, admission and expulsion policy. 4 Cases constitutionalizing the
field generally have invalidated state regulation of immigrants already within
the United States," as Congress retained leeway to "regularly make[] rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.""6 The few cases imposing consti-
tutional requirements on border regulation tended to implicate only the Due
Process Clause, the application of which the Court left ambiguous.17
The courts have made somewhat clear that legal entry into the United
States is an important trigger for a noncitizen's ability to invoke constitutional
rights." Hiroshi Motomura succinctly captures the general state of the doctrine:
The key statutory question has always been whether an alien has "en-
tered" the United States . . . . [A]liens "outside" the United States
would continue to find it very difficult to raise any constitutional chal-
lenge to immigration decisions. Those "inside" the United States could
have some success with procedural claims but would be likely to have
none with substantive claims.39
Significant scholarly criticism of the plenary power doctrine centers upon
the inside/outside distinction. Scholars have advanced a number of competing
34. E.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress
is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."); Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 663 (1892) (upholding Congress's right to detain in
exclusion proceedings).
35. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
374 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ni8 U.S. 356 (1886); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that the government lacks statutory authority to indefi-
nitely detain admitted noncitizens with final orders of removal when removal is
not reasonably foreseeable); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (applying the
Zadvydas holding to inadmissible noncitizens).
36. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
37. E.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("We agree with Plasencia that un-
der the circumstances of this case, she can invoke the Due Process Clause on re-
turning to this country, although we do not decide the contours of the process
that is due or whether the process accorded Plasencia was insufficient."); Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1953).
38. Entry is a legal concept decoupled from whether a person is physically present in
the United States. An individual paroled into the United States without formal
admission, for example, is said not to have entered. See Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958). Whether an individual who physically entered the country
without inspection has legally "entered" is generally beyond the scope of this
Note, especially in light of the Court's decision in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371
(2005), which suggests that inadmissible and deportable noncitizens stand on
equal footing with respect to their ability to challenge some forms of detention.
39. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, ioo YALE L.J. 545, 557-60 (1990).
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triggers for the application of constitutional protections-including, in some
cases, substantive claims to remain in the country-to noncitizens once present
in the United States.40 Others contend that no trigger is needed and that consti-
tutional protections automaticafly apply to all government interactions with
foreign nationals.4 ' In general, these criticisms of the plenary power model aim
to diminish Congress's authority over immigration by limiting which individu-
als Congress can regulate.
A second source of scholarly criticism of the plenary power doctrine is the
Court's inability to root the theory in constitutional text. Cases such as the Chi-
nese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting fail to identify a textual basis for allowing
Congress to regulate immigration. Calling it a "constitutional fossil" lacking any
"foundation in principle," Louis Henkin asserts that the extratextual justifica-
tions for plenary power over immigration cannot be justified in the aftermath
of the due process revolution. 42 Even if one assumes the legitimacy of the poli-
cy's origin 43 Professor Henkin's point is that the due process revolution-
40. E.g. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and 'Community Ties': A Response
to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 237, 244 (1983) ("What we 'owe' persons in terms of
process is better understood as a function of what we are taking from them
(community ties) than our relationship to them (membership in a national com-
munity).").
41. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual
Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985) ("The people
of the United States ordained a compact which... applies to everything done by
the community and its officials, in the United States and elsewhere, affecting citi-
zens and aliens alike, and concerning immigration no less than other matters.");
see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 179-82 (1987)
(discussing "individual rights"). Gerald Neuman refers to Professors Legomsky
and Henkin's theories as "[u]niversalist approaches requirling] that constitution-
al provisions that create rights with no express limitations as to the persons or
places covered should be interpreted as applicable to every person and at every
place." Neuman, supra note 16, at 916.
42. Henkin, supra note 22, at 862-63. Professor Henkin is by no means the only schol-
ar to push for the application of the Due Process Clause to federal regulation of
the border. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality
Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415 (2012); cf Motomura, supra note 39 (urg-
ing courts to directly confront constitutional norms when interpreting iunigra-
tion laws).
43. Professor Henkin does not make any such concession, noting that the doctrine
was created "in the oppressive shadow of a racist, nativist mood a hundred years
ago" and "reaffirmed during our fearful, cold war, McCarthy days." Henkin, su-
pra note 22, at 862; see also Chin, supra note 22 (attributing the plenary power
doctrine to nineteenth-century racist practices).
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rooted as it is in constitutional text-trumps the extratextual edifice that is fed-
eral power over immigration.44
In a similar vein, Owen Fiss argues that the plenary power doctrine must, in
certain contexts, yield to the modern understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause.4' Assuming the validity of the plenary power doctrine, 4 Professor Fiss
argues that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits government from imposing
"social disabilities" upon noncitizens-even those without lawful authorization
to be present in the United States.4 7 In this sense, Professor Fiss accepts the in-
side/outside distinction and uses it to bifurcate the field of immigration law by
arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government from imposing
special disabilities on noncitizens once in the country, even in a world where
Congress has unfettered authority to regulate the nation's borders.
Professors Henkin and Fiss attempt to subordinate Congress's plenary
power over immigration to our modern understanding of the Constitution's
guarantees of individual liberty in the Due Process Clauses and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The Court has waded into this debate only tentatively, and with
inconclusive results. The following Section reviews the statutory scheme gov-
erning immigration detention and the leading cases interpreting those statutes.
44. Professor Henkin calls the plenary power doctrine "a constitutional fossil, a rem-
nant of a prerights jurisprudence that we have proudly rejected in other respects."
Henkin, supra note 22, at 862. He notes that the doctrine was created in an era
in which constitutional restraints were deemed inapplicable to actions by
the United States outside its territory; . . . when the Bill of Rights had not
yet become our national hallmark and the principal justification and
preoccupation of judicial review. It was an era before ... important free-
doms were recognized as preferred, inviting strict scrutiny if they were
invaded and requiring a compelling public interest to uphold their inva-
sion. Since that era, the Supreme Court has held that the Bill of Rights
applies to foreign as well as to domestic affairs, in war as well as in peace,
to aliens as well as to citizens, abroad as well as at home.
Id. at 862-63.
45. Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS 3 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds.,
1999). Many other scholars join Professor Fiss in advocating for the application of
the Equal Protection Clause to the regulation of immigration. See Victor C. Ro-
mero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of
Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 76 OR. L.
REV. 425 (1997); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Consti-
tutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996); see also Chin, supra note 22, at 70
(discussing judicial review of "racial classifications in the immigration context").
46. See Fiss, supra note 45, at 16 ("In calling into question laws excluding immigrants
from welfare and educational programs and barring them from working, I am not
surreptitiously questioning the validity of laws regulating the admission of immi-
grants into this country.").
47. Id. at 15-21.
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C. The Structure of Immigration Detention
Among the myriad manifestations of the plenary power doctrine in con-
temporary immigration law, Congress exercises substantial authority over the
detention of noncitizens awaiting removal proceedings or deportation from the
United States. The statutes governing immigration detention are complex and
intimately related to the sometimes labyrinthine immigration removal
process .4
A removal proceeding begins when an alleged noncitizen is served with a
Notice to Appear in immigration court before an immigration judge.4 9 In every
case, the immigration judge is to determine if the respondent is removable from
the United States."o If the immigration judge determines that the respondent is
removable, the immigration judge enters a removal order against the respon-
dent. Both the government and the respondent have the right to appeal an ad-
verse decision of the immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). 5 ' The BIA issues the final administrative order in a given removal case by
affirming or reversing the decision of the immigration judge. Only once the BIA
has entered a final administrative order can the respondent enter the Article III
courts by appealing directly to the courts of appeals, which have limited juris-
diction to review the orders of the BIA.5 1
48. "The statutory scheme governing the detention of aliens in removal proceedings is
not static; rather, the Attorney General's authority over an alien's detention shifts
as the alien moves through different phases of administrative and judicial review.
This makes the task of determining where an alien falls within this scheme partic-
ularly difficult for a reviewing court, because the Attorney General's authority
over the alien can present a moving target." Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Home-
land Sec., 535 F-3d 942, 945-46 (9 th Cir. 2008).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012). Immigration judges are not Article III judges, but
rather administrative adjudicators. See Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir.
20o6) (comparing and contrasting immigration judges with Article III judges); see
also infra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the independence of immi-
gration judges).
50. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2012). Like immigration judges, BIA board members are not
Article III judges. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (creating the BIA). Together, the BIA and
the immigration courts comprise the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or
EOIR.
52. While the courts of appeal do have jurisdiction over petitions for review of the
decisions of the BIA, that jurisdiction is not plenary. For example, Article III
judges are statutorily barred from reviewing any discretionary decisions of the At-
torney General and Secretary of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012). Con-
stitutional review and review of questions of law is expressly preserved, at least on
direct appeal of an administratively final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The
government cannot appeal an adverse decision of the BIA.
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Congress substantially transformed the statutes authorizing immigration
detention in 1996.51 During the pendency of litigation, most respondents are
subject to individualized immigration detention-that is, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) can weigh the individual's equities and order a per-
son detained or released.54 (A key exception to this individualized detention
scheme during litigation is the mandatory detention of so-called "criminal
aliens.")5 5 The DHS decision can be appealed to the immigration judge and the
BIA in a series of bond redetermination hearings."' After litigation terminates,
by contrast, immigration authorities are categorically required by statute to de-
tain all noncitizens subject to a final removal order for up to ninety days while
the government makes the necessary travel arrangements.17 If the individual
cannot be removed from the United States within ninety days, detention reverts
to being an individualized decision; authorities have statutory authority either
to continue detention or to release the individual. 8 In short, immigration de-
tention comes in three "phases"-permissive, mandatory, then permissive
again.
The process varies for a group of individuals Congress has named "criminal
aliens." The term is vacuous, and includes a wide variety of petty offenders.5 9
These individuals are subject to mandatory, not permissive, detention during
the pendency of their immigration case.'o In practical terms, once immigration
authorities arrest a noncitizen potentially deportable as a "criminal alien," they
are required to detain them during proceedings and during the ninety-day re-
moval period. The individual moves into the permissive detention category on-
ly if removal is not carried out after the removal period has expired."
53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208 §§ 303, 305, 11o Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231). For a
discussion of the change in the law and its motivation, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 517-21 (2003), and Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, no COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44-45 (2010).
54. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c) (2012).
55. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
56. 8 C.F.R. § 23 6.1(d). Not everybody served with a Notice to Appear is eligible for
release. As discussed above, so-called "criminal aliens" are subject to mandatory
detention.
57. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)-(3). The Court has effectively extended the removal period
to six months. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
59. See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text for a description of the "criminal
alien" category and a discussion of the category's overly capacious boundaries.
6o. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
61. The Court has effectively extended the removal period to six months. See supra
note 57.
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Immigration detainees and public interest groups have challenged both the
permissive and mandatory detention schemes. The first challenge, Zadvydas v.
Davis,62 came to Section 1231(a)(6),6 1 which grants immigration authorities the
discretion to continue the detention of noncitizens who are subject to final or-
ders of removal, but who cannot be-for whatever reason-physically removed
from the United States.6 4 Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance,"5 the
Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Breyer, held that if the government
has not removed the noncitizen six months after obtaining a final order of re-
moval, then the noncitizen must be permitted to show "good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future."" Upon such a showing, "the [reviewing] court should hold continued
detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute."7 Seeking to
avoid cases of potentially indefinite immigration detention, the Court essential-
ly rewrote Section 1231(a)(6) in what Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent, alar-
mingly referred to as a "systemic dislocation in the balance of powers.""
In one sense, Zadvydas is a startling case. The Court essentially ordered the
release of noncitizens who had previously been ordered removed from the
United States and determined to be a risk to public safety by the executive
branch. This result is squarely at odds with the Court's nineteenth-century im-
migration jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Zadvydas, vigo-
rously defended the plenary power doctrine, saying "[d]ue process does not in-
vest any alien with a right to enter the United States, nor confer on those
admitted the right to remain against the national will. Nothing in the Constitu-
tion requires admission or sufferance of aliens hostile to our scheme of govern-
ment."*
62. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
63. All references to statutes and regulations are to Title 8 of the United States Code
and the Code of Federal Regulations, respectively, unless otherwise indicated.
64. One petitioner, Kestutis Zadvydas, was stateless, and no country would grant him
entry. 533 U.S. at 684. A second petitioner, Kim Ho Ma, was a Cambodian nation-
al, and Cambodia would not repatriate him. Id. at 686.
65. See id. at 689.
66. Id. at 701. Such a showing would create only a rebuttable presumption of release,
which the government could counter. Id.
67. Id. at 699-700.
68. Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Me-
zei, 345 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added in Zad-
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An alternative reading of Zadvydas emphasizes the triumph of a new theory
of immigration control modeled on the claims of Professors Henkin and Fiss.o
Against the backdrop of the plenary power doctrine, Justice Breyer emphasized
the constitutional concerns raised by the prospect of indefinite immigration de-
tention." The majority pointed out Zadvydas had been lawfully admitted into
the United States, suggesting that Congress's authority is diminished after ad-
mission.7 ' But more criticaly, the Court expresses confidence in the judiciary's
ability to review executive detention determinations in the immigration context
notwithstanding the potentially sensitive foreign policy consequences of such
decisions. 73 Zadvydas's injection of the federal courts into reviewing immigra-
tion officials' detention decisions thus seems to cut against the plenary power
doctrine, and indeed initial commentary on the Zadvydas decision foretold the
end of Congress's plenary power over immigration.7 4
Any concern that the Court was drastically pruning the plenary power doc-
trine was extinguished, however, two years in later in Demore v. Kim.75 Hyung
Joon Kim, a legal permanent resident and citizen of South Korea, faced removal
proceedings stemming from two criminal convictions for theft offenses, and
immigration authorities ordered his detention under Section 1226(c), the man-
datory detention statute for "criminal aliens."76 Kim argued that a system of
mandatory detention without any individualized "determination that he posed
70. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 560 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Zadvydas
was an application of principles developed in over a century of cases on the rights
of aliens and the limits on the government's power to confine individuals.").
71. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 ("A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien
would raise a serious constitutional problem."); see supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text (discussing academic criticism of the entry fiction).
72. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 ("We deal here with aliens who were admitted to the
United States but subsequently ordered removed. Aliens who have not yet gained
initial admission to this country would present a very different question."); see al-
so id. at 693 (holding that the fact of admission "ma[k]e[s] all the difference").
Notwithstanding this qualification, in Clark v. Martinez, 534 U.S. 371 (2005), the
Court extended the Zadvydas interpretation of Section 1231(a)(6) to cover all
post-removal period detention, including the detention of inadmissible nonciti-
zens.
73. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
74. E.g., Joshua W. Gardner, Note, Halfway There: Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in Indefi-
nite Detention, but Leaves Much Unanswered, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 177, 189-90
(2003); cf David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for
Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 71-72 (not-
ing that the Court found the government's plenary powers argument to be "un-
availing").
75. 538 U.S. 510.
76. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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either a danger to society or a flight risk" violated the Due Process Clause.7 The
Court considered two questions: first, whether it had jurisdiction to hear Kim's
challenge,78 and second, whether his detention was constitutional. After a ma-
jority of Justices found jurisdiction to hear the case, a different coalition of Jus-
tices then held that Section 1226(c) presented no due process concerns in autho-
rizing the mandatory detention of noncitizens with certain criminal convictions
even without any personalized assessment of risk or flight, with only Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist in both majorities.79 The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, re-
lied on two observations to uphold Section 1226(c). First, the Court found per-
suasive the government's argument that detention under the challenged statute
is "brief," usually measured in weeks or months."o Second, the Court found the
statute to be a reasonable response to a large number of failures to appear in
immigration court." Stating "when the Government deals with deportable
aliens, the Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burden-
some means to accomplish its goal," the Court distinguished away Zadvydas
and upheld Section 1226(c). 82
As a doctrinal matter, Demore initially appears inconsistent with Zadvydas,
and, indeed, such claims were the early focus of the academic commentary sur-
rounding the later decision.3 As a realist matter, however, the distinction be-
tween Zadvydas and Demore is somewhat easier to understand. The Justices are
engaged in a now-ancient debate over the proper scope of Congress's plenary
77. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514.
78. The government had claimed that Section 1226(e) divested the Court of jurisdic-
tion to hear Kim's challenge, an argument the Court rejected on statutory
grounds. See id. at 516-18.
79. Justice Kennedy believed that Kim had been given adequate process. Id. at 532
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (BIA 1999).
The goal of a Joseph hearing is not to determine eligibility for release, but rather to
establish if the government has properly charged the respondent as a "criminal
alien." In a Joseph hearing, the burden is on the respondent to show that his or her
criminal conviction is insufficient to trigger a ground of removability on the basis
of criminal history, and thus Section 1226(c) should not govern the respondent's
detention. The Joseph inquiry is about whether the respondent is properly a
member of the class contemplated by Section 1226(c). The hearing does not per-
mit the respondent to challenge the fact of detention but only whether he or she is
a member of the class.
80. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528-29.
81. Id. at 527-28.
82. Id. at 528.
83. See Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 55 SuP. CT. REv. 231, 251 (2003)
(calling Zadvydas and Demore "utterly inconsistent in tone and approach"); Peter
J. Spiro, The Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1492, 1498 n.23 (2003)
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power over immigration and the relationship between that authority and regu-
larly recognized constitutional rights, especially the rights to habeas review and
due process. Largely absent from this debate is sufficient discussion of the his-
torical availability of habeas corpus to challenge nonpunitive detention. The
following Part turns to this topic.
II. WHY A CONSTITUTIONALIZED THEORY
Scholars challenging the plenary power doctrine seek to constitutionalize
immigration law. In the previous Part, I presented the writings of Professors
Henkin and Fiss as exemplars of this approach, though they are far from the
only scholars advocating it. The purpose of this Part is not to replicate their ar-
gument, but rather to apply it to the immigration detention paradigm.
A. Habeas Corpus, Noncitizens, and Nonpunitive Detention
We start with constitutional text and the preratification legal practices that
inform it. Though the precise contours of the Suspension Clause remain unset-
tled, the modern understanding of the Suspension Clause is that-at a mini-
mum-it protects whatever jurisdiction habeas courts enjoyed in 1789.84 Start-
ing from this point of departure, Justice O'Connor, writing separately in
Demore, argued that "it appears that in 1789, and thereafter until very recently,
the writ [of habeas corpus] was not generally available to aliens to challenge
their detention while removal proceedings were ongoing."8 5 Justice O'Connor
acknowledged that, because there is no direct analogue to immigration pro-
ceedings in the early days of the United States, this question is difficult to an-
swer.86 But the Justice stops there, without turning to suitable analogies that
84. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
746 (2008) ("The Court has been careful not to foreclose the possibility that the
protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded along with post-1789 devel-
opments that define the present scope of the writ. But the analysis may begin with
precedents as of 1789, for the Court has said that 'at the absolute minimum' the
Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and rati-
fied." (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301) (citation omitted)); id. at 815 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing approvingly to St. Cyr). Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined Justice Stevens's St. Cyr opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined Justice O'Connor's Demore opinion; all three Justices dissented in St. Cyr
but appear to have acquiesced to its reasoning by 2004. There thus appears to be
general acceptance among the Justices that habeas jurisprudence in 1789 is the ap-
propriate starting point for determining the scope of the Suspension Clause's pro-
tections. The remaining disagreement is as to whether 1789 also represents the
ending point of the inquiry. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension
Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, iio COLUM. L. REV. 537, 543-45 (2oo).
85. Demore, 538 U.S. at 539 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
86. See id. at 538.
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may shed light on the Founding generation's understanding of the writ they en-
shrined directly into the Constitution. Instead of focusing on the narrow exam-
ple of deportation proceedings, the proper inquiry focuses on noncitizens'
access to habeas review and on the availability of habeas review for nonpunitive
detention.
The development of habeas corpus is well researched and thoroughly de-
bated, and I do not seek involvement in the ongoing discussion of why the writ
developed as it did in England." My claim here is merely descriptive: habeas re-
view of imprisonment was available to noncitizens held in what we would today
recognize as regulatory, as opposed to punitive, detention.88
87. For collecting many of the sources in this section, I owe a significant debt to Jona-
than L. Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2521-22 (1998). Recent scholarship on early
English practice is voluminous. See, e.g., PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:
FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010); Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus
Procedures and Long-Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 961
(2009); Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to Habeas Corpus
in International Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 551, 552-58 (2009);
Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperi-
al Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008); Amanda L. Ty-
ler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARv. L. REV. 901,
923-54 (2012).
88. Modern doctrine distinguishes between punitive and regulatory detention. See
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987). Whether incarceration is pu-
nitive or regulatory turns on legislative intent in fashioning the sanction, see id.,
and, if intent is not dispositive, a number of other factors. These include whether
there is a scienter requirement, the historic understanding of the sanction, the re-
lationship between the sanction and criminal activity, and, importantly for
present purposes, whether the sanction is not excessive of its assigned purpose.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
As a formal matter, immigration enforcement and detention are regulatory, or
civil, in nature. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2ool); INS v. Lo-
pez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("A deportation proceeding is a purely
civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an un-
lawful entry . . . ."); Whitney Chelgren, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is
Unconstitutional To Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1477, 1489-90 (2011); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Lim-
its on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1015-21 (2002); cf United States v.
Guevara-Umana, 538 F.3d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that absent collusion
with criminal authorities, civil immigration and enforcement is civil); Wishnie,
supra note 42, at 417 ("[i]mmigration law... is formally civil but functionally
quasi-criminal . . . ."). Chelgren argues that though formally regulatory, immigra-
tion detention has in effect become punitive due to the increasingly harsh condi-
tions found in immigration detention facilities and the prolonged nature of much
immigration detention. See Chelgren, supra, at 1489-1490. See generally Ingrid V.
Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281 (2010) (noting the grow-
ing focus on the convergence of the immigration and criminal justice systems).
Without discounting these arguments, I continue to approach immigration de-
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English courts did not have statutory authority to review noncriminal de-
tention until 1816.89 But because habeas jurisdiction was a long-standing com-
mon law check on unlawful executive detention, that lack of statutory authority
at the time of the Founding is largely irrelevant. Prior to 1787, English courts
routinely reviewed noncriminal, that is, regulatory, detention. English courts
reviewed the impressment of sailors, 0 child custody disputes,9' confinement to
insane asylums," incarceration ordered due to failure to repay debt,93 and even
a husband's unlawful restraint of his wife's freedom. 94 These are not isolated
cases; Paul Halliday's survey of habeas petitions issuing from the court of the
King's Bench every four years during the period from 1502 to 1798 showed that
slightly more than ten percent of habeas returns alleged no criminal basis for
detention, but rather noncriminal explanations such as "'lunacy,' family custo-
dy disputes, and impressment." 9 Ninety-six percent of prisoners held for non-
criminal reasons were ordered released. 9'
Not only were individuals able to challenge regulatory detention, habeas re-
lief was also recognized to be available to non-Englishmen. According to Hals-
bury's Laws of England:
In any matter involving the liberty of the subject the action of the
Crown or its ministers or officials is subject to the supervision and con-
trol of the judges on habeas corpus. The judges owe a duty to safeguard
the liberty of the subject not only to the subjects of the Crown, but also
to all persons within the realm who are under the protection of the
Crown . . . and this whether they are alien friends or alien enemies.97
Halsbury's Laws of England primarily draws on both statutes and cases from the
twentieth century, but even prior to 1787,9' English courts exercised jurisdiction
tention as a civil matter, largely because it is the more difficult claim to make, at
least with respect to the historical evidence presented in this Part.
89. See Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, 56 Geo. 3, 100 (Eng.).
go. E.g., Goldswain's Case, (1778) 96 Eng. Rep. 711 (C.P.).
91. E.g., R. v. Delaval, (1763) 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B.).
92. E.g., R. v. Turlington, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B.).
93. E.g., R. v. Nathan, (1730) 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B.).
94. E.g., Lister's Case, (1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 17 (K.B.).
95. HALLIDAY, supra note 87, at 319.
96. Id.
97. 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 25 (3d ed. 1955) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted); see also Halliday & White, supra note 87, at 605 ("[I1n the many cases of
foreigners using habeas corpus the issue of their foreignness was almost never dis-
cussed, much less used to bar review of detention orders.").
98. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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to adjudicate noncitizens' challenges to their status as prisoners of war99 and
slaves' as well as forms of private custody.'o' In short, neither noncitizens nor
noncriminal detainees faced jurisdictional bars to habeas relief at English com-
mon law in 1789. The Founding generation in America was aware of the availa-
bility of habeas relief to noncitizens and in noncriminal cases in England."0 2
The early Republic's habeas jurisprudence confirms the availability of the
writ to noncitizens and to individuals challenging nonpunitive detention. In a
1797 case, United States v. Villato, the circuit court granted habeas relief to a
Spanish citizen; indeed, the question in Villato was whether the defendant had
naturalized and could therefore be convicted of treason in an American
court.0 3 In Ex Parte Bollman, the Court ordered the pretrial release of a crimi-
nal de-
tainee after finding such detention to be unjustified. 04 And in United States v.
Green, Justice Story, riding circuit, entertained a habeas petition in a family cus-
tody dispute case without questioning the court's jurisdiction to hear a habeas
challenge to private custody.' These cases yield a simple distillate: American
judicial practice in the generation immediately proceeding the Founding con-
firms the English tradition of hearing habeas petitions brought by noncitizens
and in noncriminal cases.
In an important sense, this historical evidence simply bolsters Demore's ini-
tial holding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition. Demore,
however, went on to uphold a system of mandatory detention for a large cate-
gory of noncitizens with criminal convictions. The following Section links the
history of Great Writ with the text of the Due Process Clause to show where the
Demore analysis misses the mark.
99. E.g., R. v. Schiever, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.) (entertaining, but ultimately de-
nying, a noncitizen's habeas petition seeking a declaration that the petitioner was
not a prisoner of war).
ioo. See, e.g., Somerset v. Stewart (Somersett's Case), (1772) 98 K.B. 449 (granting ha-
beas relief to an African slave purchased in Virginia and transported to England,
which had outlawed slavery by that time).
101. The most famous such challenge occurred just after the Founding. See Ex parte
Hottentot Venus, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 344 (K.B.) (entertaining a habeas petition
of a "female native of South Africa" allegedly held in private custody).
102. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131. In particular, Somersett's Case,
handed down in 1772, was well known throughout the colonies. Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 147
(1952).
103. 28 F. Cas. 377 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 16,662).
104. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75, 1oo (1807) ("[A] court possessing the power to bail prison-
ers not committed by itself, may award a writ of habeas corpus for the exercise of
that power.").
105. 26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256).
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B. Due Process at the Founding
Habeas review allows the detainee to seek judicial review of his detention.
But what is the content of that review? Here, the Court has taken a bifurcated
approach. In Demore, it first held that the courts had habeas jurisdiction to hear
Kim's constitutional challenge; in other words, habeas was treated as the proce-
dural vehicle for the litigation."o' The Demore Court then turned to the Due
Process Clause for the substantive standards it used to judge the constitutionali-
ty of the statute.o 7 In Demore, the resulting judicial scrutiny was limited to little
more than rational basis review of the statute.'o In this Section, I argue that the
Due Process Clause precludes the government from subjecting wide swaths of
noncitizens to preventive detention without individualized review of the execu-
tive branch's decision to incarcerate the individual.
i. "No person. .. "
The Fifth Amendment, framed in terms of the individual person rather
than a larger notion of the body politic, can be analyzed by reference to other
provisions of the Bill of Rights."o9 The Second and Fourth Amendments speak
of "the people.""o Professor Akhil Amar has advanced a "republican reading" of
the word "people" in these amendments."' Amar argues that "the people" is a
direct reference to the militia;" it is precisely because "the people" form the mi-
litia that the Constitution secures their right to bear arms and repel illegal
searches. These amendments aim to check government tyranny; by ensuring the
government could not confiscate the militia's weapons, the militia would re-
106. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003).
107. See id. at 528 ("[W]hen the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due
Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to ac-
complish its goal.").
108. The Court never states what standard of review it employs, but its inquiry mirrors
the rational basis test. See id. at 527-31.
109. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
110. U.S. CONST. amends. II & IV.
In. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 323-24 (2005).
n2. Id. at 322-26.
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main a viable check on government overreach."' This collective, republican
reading of the Second and Fourth Amendments fits with the purpose of the Bill
of Rights-namely, the creation of a structural restraint on government author-
ity.114
In contrast to the Second and Fourth Amendments, the Fifth Amendment's
command that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law" is phrased in individual, rather than collective,
terms."' This command has three relevant elements. First, the drafters of the
Amendment chose to frame it as a broadly applicable individual guarantee. In-
clusion among "the people" was predicated upon exercise of the franchise, but
being a legal "person" was not."' Though Amar's exegesis is silent as to the rela-
tionship between noncitizens and the Fifth Amendment, the early Court was
not. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Comp., the Court
stated that
to ascertain whether [a] process, enacted by Congress, is due
process. . . we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceed-
ing existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emi-
gration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been un-
suited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country."'7
I do not invoke Murray's Lessee for its doctrinal authority."' Rather, I point to
the practice at English common law of exercising jurisdiction over noncitizens'
habeas petitions" to suggest that noncitizens would have been understood to
113. See id. at 323.
114. Cf Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Govern-
mental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1998) (distinguishing between structural re-
straints on governmental authority and individually secured rights intended to
promote individual freedom).
115. U.S. CONST. amend V.
116. Cf AMAR, supra note iii, at 324 (noting women were not among "the people" but
could be legal "persons" at the time of the Founding).
117. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77 (1855).
118. The Court would later abandon interpreting the Fifth Amendment in light of
English common law. Hurtado v. California, no U.S. 516, 528 (1884) ("[A] process
of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law,
if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country;
but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process of law."); see also
Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 422 (2010) (discussing Murray's Lessee and subsequent Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence).
119. See supra notes 97-1l and accompanying text.
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be juridical "persons" between 1789 and 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was
proposed and ratified.20
2. ". . . liberty...
Similarly, the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause must
protect an individual's freedom from regulatory detention (to include immigra-
tion detention) without due process of law. Again, it is helpful to interpret the
word "liberty" with reference to other forms of individual freedom.
In its larger immigration jurisprudence, the Court frequently notes that
noncitizens do not have a due process right to remain in the United States."'
On this reading, the Constitution does not protect the noncitizen's right to stay.
This debate is, to be sure, unsettled, with some recognition that removal from
the United States is a penalty 2  and that at least long-term permanent residents
may have a weighty liberty interest in their ability to remain in the United
States."' But the law is clear-while a noncitizen may be entitled to procedural
due process in an immigration hearing,'2 4 he has no substantive right to remain
in the country."'
Plenary power theorists, however, have conflated this second-order liberty
interest-the right to remain-with a constitutionally protected first-order lib-
erty interest-the right to freedom from detention. Citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei,
a Cold War-era case upholding the government's ability to prohibit the entry of
a noncitizen into the country, Justice Scalia's dissent in Zadvydas is a helpful ex-
ample of plenary power theorists' approach to immigration detention:
"Due process does not invest any alien with a right to enter the United
States, nor confer on those admitted the right to remain against the na-
tional will. Nothing in the Constitution requires admission or suffer-
ance of aliens hostile to our scheme of government." Insofar as a
claimed legal right to release into this country is concerned, an alien
120. There is a dearth of legislative history concerning the Fifth Amendment's drafting
and ratification. See Williams, supra note 118, at 445 n.149 (collecting sources).
121. E.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1950) ("Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry
is concerned.").
122. E.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 154 (1945); see also Wishnie, supra note 42, at 424-35 (describing the increas-
ingly punitive nature of immigration laws).
123. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 548 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
124. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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under final order of removal stands on an equal footing with an inad-
missible alien at the threshold of entry: He has no such right."'
Justice Scalia starts with the premise that an inadmissible alien may assert nei-
ther substantive nor procedural due process rights at the gate to the country.
Indeed, in Mezei the Court held that Mezei, a noncitizen stranded on Ellis Is-
land seeking admission into the United States, had neither a substantive right to
enter the country nor a procedural right to challenge the government's decision
not to admit him. 7
In extrapolating from this doctrinally uncontroversial premise, however,
Justice Scalia's argument loses force. How does Mezei's lack of a substantive
right to enter the country bear on Zadvydas's claim to freedom from incarceration
once lawfully admitted into the United States? Justice Scalia offers no justifica-
tion for the conflation of these two distinct liberty interests. Indeed, it would be
difficult to do so. The former interest is nowhere mentioned in the Constitu-
tion; that document's silence with respect to any right of entry facilitated the
development of the extratextual plenary power doctrine upon which Justice
Scalia relied. By contrast, the Founding generation specifically incorporated a
habeas corpus guarantee into the Constitution and recognized a liberty interest
in the Fifth Amendment. The historical availability of habeas relief from non-
punitive and even private detention suggests that the "liberty" protected by the
Fifth Amendment must encompass freedom from any government-ordered re-
straint."' Constitutional text thus cuts against Justice Scalia's argument by ex-
pressly protecting the first-order liberty interest-freedom from incarcera-
tion-while leaving successive generations less direction with respect to the
second-order liberty interest-freedom to be present.
3. ". . . due process of law..."
While I turn to constitutional text and historical practice to show that a
noncitizen's right to challenge regulatory detention falls within the scope of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, I rely on modern practice to guide the
structuring of the ensuing review. With the growth of the administrative state
126. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 222-23). Though written in dissent, the logic of
Justice Scalia's dissent carried the day in Demore.
127. 345 U.S. at 212-16.
128. This is not a case of seeking constitutional protection for a life, liberty, or property
interest that was not recognized in 1789, but is understood to fit within the mod-
ern conception of any of those terms. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (ar-
guing for constitutional protection of entitlement payments as "property" pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause). Without expressing any opinion on such an
argument, I do not seek to expand the boundaries of what "liberty" encompassed
at the time of the Founding.
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and in the wake of the due process revolution, our modern conception of due
process has changed. Take, for example, tax collection. In the early Republic,
petitions for relief from penalties on unpaid taxes were presented to a federal
judge, who had statutory authority to create a record of the taxpayer's appeal. 9
The judge then forwarded the record onto the Secretary of the Treasury, who
adjudicated the petition.' The Secretary's decision was final; there was no judi-
cial review.' 3' Contrast that relatively simple system with today's method of ad-
judicating taxation disputes: an Article I Tax Court reviews unpaid deficiencies
while refund claims can be brought either in the district court or the Court of
Federal Claims. Then, depending upon which lower court heard the initial liti-
gation, appellate review may lie either in the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit or one of the twelve non-specialized courts of appeals. 2 This shift to
more process, both administrative and judicial, can also be seen in the provision
of veterans' benefits, 33 entitlement programs, 34 and public employment deci-
sions,' 3 among other facets of life in the administrative state. In short, our
modern understanding of the level of process "due" varies significantly from the
Founding generation's conception.
Nevertheless, I need not completely abandon my commitment to drawing
on historical practice. Habeas review of nonpunitive detention prior to 1789
provides a strong analogy to the modern Court's preventive detention jurispru-
dence. The remainder of this Section seeks to draw the analogy between these
ancient cases and modern judicial practice.
One case in particular merits special discussion. In Rex v. Turlington, a hus-
band committed his apparently sane wife, Deborah D'Vebre, to an asylum in
the midst of a marital dispute.13 Lord Mansfield issued a writ of habeas corpus,
129. An Act To Provide for Mitigating or Remitting the Forfeitures and Penalties Ac-
cruing Under the Revenue Laws, in Certain Cases Therein Mentioned, ch. 12, § 1, 1
Stat. 122, 123 (1790); see Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:
Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1331-32 (2006).
130. Mashaw, supra note 129, at 1331-32.
131. Id.
132. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIEs 85, 88 (6th ed. 2009).
133. Many Revolutionary War veterans had to petition Congress directly for their ben-
efits, which would only be conferred upon approval of a private bill. Cf Mashaw,
supra note 129, at 1332-33 (describing judicial objections to the 1792 Pension Act).
Today, claims are adjudicated by the Board of Veterans' Appeals, with appellate
review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and then the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7252, 7292 (2012).
134. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
135. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
136. R. v. Turlington, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B.).
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ordered a neutral doctor to examine Mrs. D'Vebre, and, as "[sihe appeared ab-
solutely free from the least appearance of insanity," ordered her release.3 7
Turlington bears strong resemblance to contemporary regulatory detention
cases. It presages a line of cases reviewing civil commitment of the mentally ill.
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court reviewed that state's mechanism for ordering
the civil commitment of a criminal defendant acquitted by reason of insanity."'
The Court noted that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a signifi-
cant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"' 9 and further
stated that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental ac-
tion." 4 In Addington v. Texas, another civil commitment case, the Court noted
that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection.""'4 While neither Foucha nor Ad-
dington bans civil detention, they do link the loss of civil confinement to the li-
berty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
Foucha and Addington are only two in a line of preventive detention cases.
Perhaps most relevant is United States v. Salerno,'142 in which the petitioners
brought a constitutional challenge to the Bail Reform Act, 43 which permits pre-
trial detention of criminal defendants. The Salerno Court ultimately upheld the
Act, but did so even while seeking "not [to] minimize the importance and fun-
damental nature" of an individual's liberty interest. 4 4 In recognition of the
fundamentally important nature of the infringement, the Salerno Court sus-
tained the Bail Reform Act only after noting that the government provided de-
tainees a number of safeguards. 1 4 In another quasi-criminal context, specifically
the detention of delinquent minors, the Court has also recognized the funda-
137. Id.
138. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
139. Id. at 80 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
140. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1992)); see also id. at go (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) ("As incarceration of persons is the most common and one of
the most feared instruments of state oppression and state indifference, we ought
to acknowledge at the outset that freedom from this restraint is essential to the ba-
sic definition of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion.").
141. 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-80 (describing the liberty
interest in civil commitment hearings for the mentally ill).
142. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012). Pretrial detention is regulatory detention. Salerno, 481
U.S. at 746.
144. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; see also id. at 755 ("In our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.").
145. For a discussion of these safeguards, see infra Section IV.B.
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mental liberty interest at stake and specifically held that the Due Process Clause
governs the applicable detention scheme.146
In this Part, I have sought to link pre-1789 English habeas practice to the
Supreme Court's modern regulatory detention jurisprudence. The Due Process
Clause and habeas corpus review have historically been available to noncitizens
and to individuals challenging regulatory detention (including noncitizens).
The Due Process Clause constitutionalizes the liberty interest implicated in
these early English cases, a point recognized in the modern cases. In Parts III
and IV, I return to the Court's modern regulatory detention jurisprudence to
describe the operation of a constitutionalized immigration detention system.
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING MANDATORY IMMIGRATION DETENTION
Broadly speaking, statutes authorizing immigration detention can be clas-
sified as either mandatory or permissive. Mandatory detention statutes require
the government to detain certain groups of noncitizens, usually based on a
criminal conviction' 47 or the status of their immigration proceeding.148 Permis-
sive detention statutes confer large discretion to the government by allowing
law enforcement to set bond for noncitizens in immigration proceedings.'49 Be-
cause of their different modes of operation, the constitutional analysis of each
category of statutes differs. In this Part, I discuss the implications of a constitu-
tionalized immigration detention theory for mandatory detention. In Part IV, I
discuss the implications for permissive detention.
A. The Statutory Scheme
Two statutes authorize categorical immigration detention. Sections 1226(c)
and 1231(a)(6) require the government to detain noncitizens without any in-
quiry into individual circumstances. Group membership, either as an alleged
"criminal alien" or as the subject of an unreviewable final order, suffices to trig-
ger mandatory detention.
Section 1226(c) requires the government to detain "criminal aliens" during
the pendency of their immigration proceedings.' Ordinarily, after initiating
removal proceedings against an individual, administrative adjudicators deter-
mine if the person will be detained, released on bond, or released on their own
146. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (describing a juvenile's interest in
"freedom from institutional restraints" as "substantial").
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2012) (mandating detention for individuals with judicially
final removal orders).
149. These initial bond determinations are later reviewed by immigration judges. See
infra Part V.
15o. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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recognizance.' But the situation is different for most individuals who are de-
portable on the basis of criminal convictions. Congress requires the government
to detain these so-called "criminal aliens" while the respondent's immigration
case is litigated in the immigration court, the BIA, and then the court of ap-
peals."' Section 1226(c) does not entitle the noncitizen to any process weighing
the traditional bail factors, including his risk of flight and ties to the communi-
ty."' This is the statute upheld in Demore v. Kim.'14
After the litigation is over and a final removal order is entered against the
noncitizen, Section 1231(a)(2) requires the government to arrest the individual.
Unlike Section 1226, which treats individuals with criminal records differently
than all other respondents, Section 1231(a)(2) applies to any person subject to a
final removal order. Once a removal order is entered, the "removal period" be-
gins. The statute defines the removal period as a ninety-day window in which
the government is supposed to effectuate the detainee's deportation from the
United States.'" Approximately eighty percent of all final orders of removal are
executed within the anticipated ninety-day window.156 The Supreme Court im-
plicitly upheld the constitutionality of Section 1231(a)(2) in Zadvydas v. Davis,
when it found that immigration detention can be considered prolonged (and
thus presumptively unconstitutional) six months after a removal order becomes
final.'57
B. Constitutional Analysis
In Schall v. Martin, the Court faced a challenge to a New York statute au-
thorizing pretrial detention of juveniles. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that such detention is regulatory in nature, and then went on
to state the test for evaluating regulatory detention schemes:
The question before us is whether preventive detention of juveniles ...
is compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due process.
Two separate inquiries are necessary to answer this question. First, does
151. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (describing
the general bond process for noncitizens without criminal convictions).
152. See supra notes 58-61 (describing mandatory detention of noncitizens with crimi-
nal convictions). See infra note 163 for a description of the composition of the
"criminal alien" class.
153. Respondents charged as "criminal aliens" are entitled to a Joseph hearing. See su-
pra note 79.
154. See 538 U.S. 510, 529 (2003).
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2012).
156. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ICE's
COMPLIANCE WITH DETENTION LIMITS FOR ALIENS WITH A FINAL ORDER OF RE-
MOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 10 (2007).
157. 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
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preventive detention under the... statute serve a legitimate state ob-
jective? And, second, are the procedural safeguards contained in the
[statute] adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some
juveniles charged with crimes?"'
This passage represents a succinct statement of the law at the time,' and sub-
sequent regulatory detention cases applied it.'
When considering Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2), the answer to the first
Schall question is a resounding "no." In Demore, the government defended Sec-
tion 1226(c) by arguing that the statute furthered two important governmental
interests: protecting the public from dangerous noncitizens and ensuring com-
pliance with the immigration laws by preventing flight.'6 ' But closer examina-
tion makes plain the true governmental interest at play in Section 1226(c): ad-
ministrative convenience.
Section 1226(c) makes no effort to determine which noncitizens are flight
risks or a danger to public safety. Instead, the section uses a single, overbroad
criterion as a proxy for these characteristics. Given the misalignment between
past criminality on one hand and either a propensity to flee or to be dangerous
on the other, the governmental interest behind Section 1226(c) must be to ease
the administrative burden of determining which individuals will be detained
during immigration proceedings. 16,
Not all noncitizens with criminal convictions are potentially dangerous or
flight risks. Any individual removable on the basis of a conviction of an "aggra-
vated felony" or a "crime involving moral turpitude" must be detained under
158. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1984) (citations omitted).
159. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (holding that
regulatory detention is permissible when, among other satisfied inquiries, the
state's asserted interest "to which [the detention] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether [such detention] appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned" to it).
160. E.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-52 (1987) (citing and applying the
test elaborated in Schall).
161. Brief for the Petitioner at 12-22, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491),
2002 WL 31016560, at *10-14. For a discussion of these rationales, see infra Section
IV.A.
162. Legislative history provides some support for the idea that Congress saw Section
1226(c) as administratively convenient. See Brief for the Petitioner at 21, Demore,
538 U.S. 510 (No. 01-1491), 2002 WL 31016560, at *14 ("'Congress should consider
requiring that all aggravated felons be detained pending deportation. Such a step
may be necessary because of the high rate of no-shows for those "criminal aliens"
released on bond."') (quoting S. REP. No. 104-48, at 32 (1995)). Instead of deter-
mining which individuals might be "no-shows," the mentality is to lock down
anyone Congress thought might flee.
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Section 1226(c). The definitions of these phrases are overly broad, 6 and include
many minor crimes that neither involve dangerous activity nor imply that the
individual may flee when faced with immigration proceedings.'6 4 The statute
163. Certain convictions for shoplifting, gambling crimes, and failure to appear in
court are "aggravated felonies." 8 U.S.C. § no(a)(43) (2012). See also Nancy Mor-
awetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV 1936, 1939-40 (2000) (criticizing the
"Alice-in-Wonderland-like definition of the term 'aggravated felony"'); Melissa
Cook, Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 293, 296-314 (2003) (tracing the expansion of deportation of criminal
noncitizens from its nineteenth-century origins through its rapid transformation
in the 1990s). An aggravated felony need not be "aggravated" or even a felony, as
many misdemeanors under state law "count" as an aggravated felony for immi-
gration purposes. Morawetz, supra, at 1939; see, e.g., Biskupski v. Attorney Gen.,
503 F-3d 274, 280 n.io, 281 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a conviction for theft, a
misdemeanor at state law, constituted an "aggravated felony" and listing similar
holdings from the courts of appeals); In re Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448, 449 (BIA
2002) ("[W]e conclude that the offense, although a misdemeanor, meets the defi-
nition of an 'aggravated felony."').
The "crimes of moral turpitude" category embraces nearly any crime involving
fraud or malice. See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 n.i (A.G. 20o8)
(defining crime involving moral turpitude as involving "reprehensible conduct
and some degree of scienter"). Crimes involving moral turpitude include Pell
Grant fraud, Izedonmwen v. INS, 37 F-3d 416 (8th Cir. 1994), and even "failure to
stop and render aid," Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir.
2007). Even the broad provision establishing removability for nearly any drug of-
fense is more expansive than most might predict. The Immigration and Nation-
ality Act grants the government authorization to deport any noncitizen "who is,
or at any time after admission has been, a drug abuser or addict." 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). In other words, no conviction is necessary to remove on
these grounds; the government must only prove addiction. These examples estab-
lish that the term "criminal alien" goes far beyond violent or repeat offenders, and
includes the pettiest of offenses.
164. Individuals are routinely placed in removal proceedings on the basis of de-
cades-old criminal history. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Deportation Looms for 5o-Year Le-
gal Resident, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2oo), http://www.huffingtonpostcom
/2010/12/20/deportation-looming-for-5_nJ99434.html (describing Immigration
and Custom Enforcement's attempt to deport a legal permanent resident over a
subsequently expunged 1978 misdemeanor conviction for the theft of an eight-
track tape). The sociological literature around the age-crime curve suggests that
youthful criminal activity bears little relationship to an individual's later-in-life
propensity to commit violent or dangerous acts. See Robert J. Sampson & Janet L.
Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and
Community-Level Risk Factors, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE:
SOCIAL INFLUENCES 1, 18 (Albert J. Reiss & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994); Travis Hir-
schi & Michael R. Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc.
552 (1983); see also John H. Laub, Daniel S. Nagin & Robert J. Sampson, Trajecto-
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defines a class using a single criterion that may fail to suggest a risk of future
dangerous activity or propensity to abscond.
Moreover, while past criminal activity may in some situations be an appro-
priate guide for determining "dangerousness" or if an individual is a flight risk,
judges setting bond in the immigration detention context should consider
cross-cutting factors as well. Salerno endorses including "the history and char-
acteristics" of the putative detainee."' An individual's "history and characteris-
tics" may well augur in favor of release or in favor of detention. A judge should
be able to consider factors such as a person's length of residence in the United
States, family responsibilities, age, employment, military service, and health
when determining if an individual is a flight risk or a danger to public safety. By
failing to consider such information in ordering detention, the statute creates
an overbroad class that fails to "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed."'6 6
Like Section 1226(c), Section 1231(a)(2) is overinclusive. The statute requires
up to ninety days of detention for noncitizens awaiting actual removal. It is true
that the incentives to flee may increase, sometimes drastically, during the re-
moval period. In 2008, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) esti-
mated that there were approximately half a million people living in the United
States with old deportation orders;"'6 many of these individuals presumably
failed to report to the immigration authorities at the commencement of the re-
moval period.'6 ' But even if the overall proportion of persons eligible for release
during the removal period is low, the government's interest in preventive de-
tention will not be sufficient to deny individualized process to all."' Like Sec-
ries of Change in Criminal Offending: Good Marriages and the Desistance Process, 63
AM. Soc. REV. 225, 230 (1998) (showing models of the age-crime curve).
165. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
166. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
167. Margot Mendelson, Shayna Strom & Michael Wishnie, Collateral Damage: An Ex-
amination of ICE's Fugitive Operations Program, MIGRATION POLY INST. 3 (Feb.
2oo9), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOP Febo9.pdf.
168. Not all individuals with old orders fail to report for deportation. A tremendous
number of removal orders are issued in absentia, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (2012),
which presents the possibility of due process deprivations in immigration court.
For general background, see Matter of Lozada, 19 1. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and
Rebecca Feldmann, Note, What Constitutes Exceptional? The Intersection of Cir-
cumstances Warranting Reopening of Removal Proceedings After Entry of an In Ab-
sentia Order of Removal and Due Process Rights of Noncitizens, 27 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 219 (2008).
169. Young children, the elderly, and the sick and hospitalized are all examples of
groups of individuals who may be particularly sympathetic candidates for release
from custody during the removal period. And even outside those groups, the
courts may find that the government can show no particularized finding of dan-
gerousness or risk of flight for a given individual.
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tion 1226(c), Section 1231(a)(2) sweeps too broadly in infringing on a funda-
mental right. Both assumptions-that "criminal aliens" and those subject to
removal are flight risks-are flawed.
Mandatory prevention statutes fail to "serve a legitimate state objective" by
drawing a broad conclusion on the basis of a single criterion for the sake of ad-
ministrative convenience.'7 o The flawed assumptions embedded in the provi-
sions offer insufficient justification for statutes authorizing the detention of
thousands of people without any individualized process.' Left without a suffi-
ciently heightened or compelling interest to justify these classifications, the gov-
ernment is unable to distinguish mandatory detention in the immigration con-
text from other forms of regulatory detention, all of which require
individualized review. The next Part examines the implications of the regulatory
detention case law in the immigration detention context.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALIZING PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION DETENTION
In the preceding Part, I argued that statutes authorizing categorical immi-
gration detention are unconstitutional. I do not contend that immigration de-
tention itself is unconstitutional; in fact, I acknowledge that in many cases the
government should be able to detain noncitizens both during the pendency of
immigration proceedings and during the removal period. The remaining task is
to discern when such detention is appropriate and which procedural safeguards
must be in place for it to occur.
A. Defining the Government's Interest
The rationales for immigration detention must be "rationally ... con-
nected""2 to "legitimate state objective[s]."7  The government defends immi-
170. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984).
171. Categorical immigration detention statutes are also invalid under the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. Though the courts have largely abandoned the doctrine in
favor of scrutiny review, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine would prohibit
the use of criminal history as a proxy for dangerousness or flight risk. In Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court considered the policies of two different
school districts that compelled pregnant schoolteachers to cease working and to
draw on sick time as they reached a certain point in their pregnancies. The ma-
jority held that presumptions "sweep [ing] too broadly" that are justified solely on
the basis of "administrative convenience [are] insufficient to make valid what is
otherwise a violation of due process of law." 414 U.S. 632, 6 44, 647 (1974). The
doctrine was later limited to apply only to "affirmative Government action which
seriously curtails important liberties cognizable under the Constitution." Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 785 (1975). The act of jailing an individual is certainly
an "affirmative Government action" and thus the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine is sufficiently vital to proscribe categorical immigration detention.
172. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
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gration detention statutes by asserting its interest in ensuring compliance with
the immigration laws and the public's safety. While these interests are certainly
legitimate, the harder question to answer is whether immigration detention is
"rationally ... connected" 174 to them in such a way that immigration detention
is not excessive."7 5
Preventing flight is reasonably related to enforcement of the immigration
laws. If an individual is going to flee the jurisdiction of the immigration court
or the execution of a removal order, the government should be able to detain
that individual to ensure compliance with its laws. This compliance rationale
provides the historical justification for bail and pretrial detention in the crimi-
nal justice context. 176
Although enforcement of the immigration laws is a civil matter, and deten-
tion is abnormal in civil law, immigration differs from a run-of-the-mill torts
action. Incentives to flee an immigration proceeding can be great.'" The effica-
cy of the nation's immigration laws depends on the government's ability to
achieve compliance with those laws, and in some cases detention may be neces-
sary to ensure that compliance.
The flight risk rationale is limited, however, by the government's ability to
effectuate an individual's removal from the United States. This is the intuition
guiding Zadvydas: when the government cannot enforce its immigration laws,
those same laws cannot justify an individual's detention. There are a variety of
situations in which the subject of a final, unreviewable removal order cannot be
physically removed from the United States. Removal may be withheld in accor-
dance with international refugee conventions.' 7 His home country may refuse
repatriation; he may be stateless;'79 or removals to that country may be sus-
173. 467 U.S. at 264 (1984).
174. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
175. Both the Kennedy and Salerno Courts specifically focus on the question of "exces-
siveness." See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) ("Nor are the inci-
dents of pretrial detention excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress
sought to achieve."); Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
176. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 665 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962).
177. The relatively high number of individuals who fail to comply with removal orders
underscores this point. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 562-64 (2003).
178. The United States withholds or defers removal when repatriation would be a vi-
olation of the Refugee Convention of 1951, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012), or the
Convention Against Torture, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note; 8 C.F.R. §§ 12o8.16-.18 (2012).
See generally Committee Against Torture, Status of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Reserva-
tions, Declarations and Objections Under the Convention, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/2/Rev.3 (Mar. 1994).
179. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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pended during wartime"o or a natural disaster."8 ' In these situations the flight
risk, or compliance, rationale must therefore be limited by the foreseeability of
actual removal from the United States, at least after a removal order is entered
against the noncitizen.'8s
The public safety rationale presents a closer call. The plenary power doc-
trine permits Congress to consider criminal history in regulating immigra-
tion-that is, to decide whether an individual can remain in the country on the
basis of criminal misconduct. But that is an entirely different endeavor from us-
ing past criminality to prospectively regulate an individual's conduct once a
criminal sentence is served.'" Other circumstances under which an individual
may be detained prospectively are narrow.'81 While the government is free to
subject noncitizens to the same civil commitment regimes that confine citi-
zens,'8 5 principles of fundamental fairness prohibit the government from mak-
ing an end-run around the strong presumption, enshrined in the Suspension
Clause and Fifth Amendment, against prospective detention.
The nation's intricate criminal justice system-including police, criminal
courts, prisons, parole, and probation-seeks to regulate public safety. These
institutions do not discriminate based on alienage; noncitizens can be investi-
gated, tried, convicted, and incarcerated for criminal misconduct just as citizens
can.'" The institutions protecting public safety are distinct from the nation's
vast immigration system, which is charged with the enforcement of civil law.'87
180. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(F) (anticipating difficulties removing noncitizens during
wartime).
181. See, e.g., Julia Preston, In Quake Aftermath, U.S. Suspends Deportations to Haiti,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/o1/14/world/americas
/14deport.html.
182. In situations where removal is only temporarily impossible, the government may
have an independent interest in obtaining a removal order even if removal is un-
foreseeable. In these situations, detention may be justified on the compliance ra-
tionale during immigration proceedings. This situation demonstrates the need for
continuous review of immigration detention.
183. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
184. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012) (release or detention of a defendant pending trial);
42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2012) (civil commitment for persons alleged to be sexually dan-
gerous).
185. See Andrew Bramante, Ending Indefinite Detention of Non-Citizens, 61 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 933, 967 (2011).
186. This norm-requiring criminal law to operate on all persons equally-is suffi-
ciently strong that Congress prohibits the government from removing a convicted
criminal before the expiration of his criminal sentence, albeit with certain excep-
tions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4) (2012).
187. Indeed, the generally robust plenary power doctrine has little bite in the criminal
justice context. Compare Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), with
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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Immigration law's historical focus on civil law cuts against bringing public safe-
ty concerns within the ambit of immigration enforcement.
Indeed, the increasing conflation of the immigration and criminal justice
systems has been the subject of much scholarly criticism' as well as tentative
judicial skepticism."' Nevertheless, immigration authorities should not be cate-
gorically denied any ability to detain a noncitizen who poses a threat to public
safety. To meet the requirement that regulatory detention not be "excessive,"
such detention must be limited to exceptional cases. This system may represent
a significant departure from the current method of determining which individ-
uals are subject to immigration detention.
Though a constitutionalized system of immigration detention would look
different from the current regime, the governmental interests in both are the
same, and they are permissible under the Court's preventive detention juris-
prudence. From here, the next Section examines the procedures required to ful-
ly constitutionalize judicial review of immigration detention.
B. Procedural Protections
There is no reason to deny law enforcement officials or immigration ad-
ministrators their current ability to make a preliminary detention determina-
tion. With the exception of categorical detention schemes, DHS officials already
have the power to release, detain, or set bond.9'9 Law enforcement officials
should be able to release an arrestee on a promise to appear and should be able
to set bond. Conferring this authority onto law enforcement ensures that law
enforcement officers will expedite some releases from detention. Also in the in-
terest of expeditious adjudication, immigration judges and the BIA should re-
tain their current authority to administratively review the initial custody deter-
mination made by law enforcement. The alterations I propose do not change
the current administrative practice.
The process of appealing an adverse administrative decision would also re-
main the same. Currently, the BIA's detention determination is reviewed in the
district court, where it becomes an ordinary federal action susceptible to review
in the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.'9 ' Constitutionalizing immi-
gration detention would not disturb this pathway to appellate review.
188. See Chelgren, supra note 88; Eagly, supra note 88.
189. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) ("[I]mmigration reforms over
time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of
judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The 'drastic measure' of
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of nonciti-
zens convicted of crimes." (citation omitted)).
190. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing for
constitutional and legal error); Nnadika v. Attorney Gen., 484 F.3d 626 (3d Cir.
2007); see also Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42 (1st. Cir. 2005) (mem.).
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The procedures at each step of the process would change. Most impor-
tantly, the Article III courts would undertake de novo review of administrative
detention decisions.'92 This Section offers a justification for such a standard of
review while examining additional procedures necessary to ensure that review is
adequate: the provision of counsel and requiring the government to bear the
burden of persuasion.
1. De Novo Review in the Federal Courts
Administrative adjudicators are inadequate protectors of fundamental in-
dividual liberties. General principles of administrative law are motivated by effi-
ciency-not liberty-concerns, and tribunals organized to further efficiency are
poorly designed to safeguard individual rights. Moreover, the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) has proven itself particularly unable to exercise
its authority independent of high-level political officials. These concerns cut in
favor of permitting the Article III courts to give administrative detention de-
terminations a hard, fresh look under the de novo standard.
Opponents of Article III review of immigration detention might stress the
unique nature of such detention, claiming that EOIR adjudicators possess ex-
pertise in all immigration matters including detention determinations and fur-
ther arguing that the Article III courts should either defer to (or abstain from
reviewing) agency decisions concerning immigration detention. Indeed, the
purported purpose behind the Chevron doctrine is to permit agencies to bring
their expertise to bear on thorny areas of public law on the theory that general-
ist judges lack the capacity to develop.' 93
Chevron represents a shift in interpretive authority from the counter-
majoritarian courts to the politically responsive executive branch.194 Such a pre-
ference for administrative adjudication may be permissible when sub-con-
stitutional public or social rights are adjudicated or even encouraged in the
name of efficiency.' 95 Majoritarian rule, however, cannot be justified when the
192. The circuit courts are presently split over which standard to employ in reviewing
immigration detention decisions, but none uses a purely de novo standard to
evaluate risk of flight and danger to the community. For a detailed discussion of
this circuit split, see infra Part V.
193. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 865-
66 (1984).
194. Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REv.
1, 74-75 (2000).
195. See Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 995, 1002 n.21
(2005) (collecting sources noting that efficiency is a "traditional ground[] for
judicial deference to administrative decisions").
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right adjudicated is constitutional.'96 The entire "purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities." 9 7 Given the Founding generation's
textual commitment to preserving robust review of detention,9' administrative
adjudication of questions of physical liberty without robust judicial review is
never appropriate, particularly given the proclivity of administrators to render
politically popular adjudications.'"
196. Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 O.J.L.S. 235, 245
(2006) ("[F]or liberties ... guaranteed by the Constitution itself... the individual
is entitled to a hearing before a federal court on his or her claim."); Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Ex-
ercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (1953) ("[A] necessary postulate of
constitutional government [is] that a court must always be available to pass on
claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such process if
the claim is sustained."). While this position from Hart's Dialogue is not univer-
sally accepted, it represents the dominant view among federal jurisdiction scho-
lars. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights,
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2038-39 (2007).
197. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 583 (1978) (arguing that the function
of the judicial branch "is to protect dissenters from a majority's tyranny"); Ken-
neth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 287 (1983) (declaring that
courts "restrain the majority's worst excesses, in the name of the constitutional
values that define our national community").
198. See supra Part II.
199. Agencies tend to pursue their missions aggressively regardless of their statutory
(and constitutional) mandates:
History clearly shows that, except in highly unusual circumstances, agen-
cies read their authority expansively and often pursue agendas far beyond
that envisioned when the agencies were created. These many causes in-
clude: pressure from the President or congressional committees; bureau-
cratic imperatives; and public (i.e., interest group) demands. Neither the
President nor Congress is likely to narrow agency discretion to limit such
tendencies when it is in their self-interest not to do so.
Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CAR-
DOzo L. REV. 989, 992 (1999).
This explanation raises the prospect that interest groups have played a role in
the drastic growth of the immigration detention system. While any discussion of
interest groups is far beyond the scope of this Note, scholars have suggested that
increasing immigration detention has "sav[ed] the private prison industry from
the brink of bankruptcy." Spencer Bruck, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Lia-
bility and Private Contracting on Health Care Services for Immigrants in Civil De-
tention, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 487, 491 (2011); see also Mary Bosworth & Emma
Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration and Imprisonment in the
United States, 22 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 429, 439-40 (2011) ("[P]rivate companies
managing contract detention facilities also operate the nation's private prisons.
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Even if this were not so, however, general principles of administrative law
would still suggest that administrative detention determinations should be judi-
cially reviewed. Chevron's emphasis on agency expertise is unavailing in a con-
text in which Article III judges possess expertise at least equal to the agency in
question. The district courts routinely consider evidence of flight risk, commu-
nity ties, and other traditional bail factors when deciding whether and at what
amount to set bail for criminal defendants.2 0 0 Immigration judges do have simi-
lar experience, but Chevron does not contemplate deference to decisions made
by administrators with expertise equal to that of the federal judiciary.
Turning to a specific analysis of EOIR, the agency exhibits a systemic lack
of institutional independence and an inability to apply the law in an even fa-
shion. Any independence EOIR adjudicators formally have from the political
process is largely illusory.2 0 ' Examples of political pressure abound. EOIR per-
sonnel are subject to summary removal by the Attorney General-a power At-
torney General John Ashcroft utilized to undermine the independence of immi-
gration judges.2 o2 Attorney General Ashcroft also altered BIA procedures, a
move widely viewed (and condemned) as an attempt to prohibit EOIR adjudi-
cators from issuing pro-immigrant decisions.2 03 The EOIR hiring process has
been criticized as biased and partisan.2 0 4 DHS officials reportedly have engaged
These companies lobby simultaneously for the privatization of prisons and the
expansion of the immigration detention facilities."); Robert Koulish, Blackwater
and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 462, 476-79
(2008) (tracing the growth of immigration detention to the political power of the
private prison lobby).
200. See Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541-42 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
201. EOIR adjudicators are not administrative law judges (ALJs), who enjoy significant
protections from political influence. For a comparison of immigration judges and
ALJs, see Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspec-
tive, 28 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 471 (20o8). For a discussion on pro-
posed reforms to the structure of the EOIR administrative process, see Stephen H.
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consis-
tency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 444-73 (2007), and Russell R. Wheeler, Practical Im-
pediments to Structural Reform and the Promise of Third Branch Analytic Methods:
A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847 (2010).
202. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369, 371-79 (2006); see also Role of Immigration in the Department of Home-
land Security Pursuant to H.R. Soo5, The Homeland Security Act of 2oo2: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Border Sec., H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
1o7th Cong. 57-61 (2002) (statement of Dana Marks Keener) (arguing, on behalf
of the National Association of Immigration Judges, that EOIR should remain
within DOJ rather than move to DHS to preserve the independence of immigra-
tion adjudicators from enforcement authorities).
203. See Legomsky, supra note 202, at 376-79.
204. Id. at 372-75; Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships
Political, NAT'L L.J. (May 30, 2007).
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in ex parte communications with supervisory EOIR personnel for the purpose
of winning a reversal of decisions adverse to the government.2 o5 The govern-
ment also claims authority to reassign an EOIR adjudicator to a lower status job
without providing that individual any process before the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board.2o' Finally, the Attorney General can overturn any decision by an
immigration judge or the BIA, 0 7 and also claims the authority to ignore an
immigration judge's release order even when the respondent has established to
the satisfaction of the immigration court that he is not a flight risk or a danger
to the community."o' These observations illustrate EOIR's inability to insulate
individuals' core constitutionally protected rights from political preferences.
EOIR adjudication is uneven. One study suggests that the single most pre-
dictive factor of the ultimate outcome of asylum cases is the identity of the im-
migration judge who hears the case. This finding is particularly problematic be-
cause DHS officials may, in some cases, game the judge assignment lottery to
select a preferred adjudicator.2 0 No mass adjudication system can deliver uni-
form justice in every case, and the circuit split discussed in Part V of this Note is
evidence of disuniformity within Article III adjudication. Nevertheless, mass
administrative adjudication routinely leads to uneven results-results that are
largely opaque to the public."o Such a system falls short of providing a "stable
bulwark of our liberties" consistent with the Constitution's emphasis on due
process and habeas corpus review."'
205. See Legomsky, supra note 202, at 373.
206. Legomsky, supra note 202, at 374.
207. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2012).
208. Matter of D-J, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003) ("INS may (but is not required to)
grant release under that provision if the alien demonstrates to its satisfaction that
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is
likely to appear for any future proceeding." (emphasis added)). Attorney General
Ashcroft's opinion overturned a BIA decision that ordered the release of a Haitian
asylum seeker who had proved that he was neither a flight nor a safety risk simply
because release was contrary to the national interest. Id. at 573. Taken to its logical
extreme (a short step from its actual position), the Attorney General's decision in
Matter of D-J- permits executive detention of any noncitizen regardless of the
bond provisions currently mandated by statute. See Margaret H. Taylor, Danger-
ous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. REV.
149, 164-68 (2004).
209. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The
Deja Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475
(2007).
210. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, at XXi-XXil
(1978). By contrast, circuit splits are visible and routinely resolved by the Supreme
Court.
211. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137.
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While administrative adjudication is not designed to check government en-
croachment on individual liberties, this is precisely the institutional role of the
Article III courts.m' Coupled with the importance of the individual interest at
stake, these observations surrounding institutional capacity suggest little reason
for Article III courts to defer to administrative detention determinations. In-
stead, the Article III courts ought to make de novo findings as to risk of flight
and public safety.
2. Access to Counsel and the Burden of Persuasion
The government is required to provide counsel in a number of civil pro-
ceedings that may lead to incarceration. 13 That rule, however, is not categorical;
counsel is not required in at least some administrative proceedings leading to
incarceration. 14 The challenge here is to derive the principle at work in the
Court's cases concerning the provision of counsel in civil proceedings and de-
termine the implications for immigration detention proceedings.
The recent case of Turner v. Rogers'15 presents perhaps the most formidable
obstacle to any theory that the Constitution requires counsel to be provided in
immigration detention hearings. In Turner, the petitioner, an indigent parent,
was held in civil contempt for failure to pay child support. The Turner Court
ultimately held the petitioner's detention to be unlawful on an unrelated basis.
En passant to its disposition of the case, the Court held that Turner had no right
to government-provided counsel in the civil contempt hearing that led to his
year-long incarceration."' The boundary between civil and criminal contempt
is thin, and the duration of Turner's detention was significant, making Turner
at least somewhat analogous to the immigration detention context.
Turner, however, speaks little to immigration detention. The Court inten-
tionally states its holding narrowly, cabining its effect to "civ-
212. See supra notes 196-199 and accompanying text.
213. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-42 (1967) (requiring provision of counsel in civil ju-
venile delinquency proceedings); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980) (plu-
rality opinion) (requiring the provision of counsel in an administrative hearing to
determine if a criminal inmate can be transferred to a mental health institution);
cf 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (2012) (providing counsel for criminal defendants
challenging pretrial detention).
214. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (holding that the Due Process
Clause does not require state-provided counsel in at least some civil contempt
proceedings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that the Due
Process Clause does not require provision of counsel in probation hearings); see
also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding
that the state is not required to provide counsel in hearings to terminate parental
rights).
215. 131 S. Ct. 2507.
216. Id. at 2520.
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il contempt proceedings [concerning] an indigent individual who is subject to a
child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a
year)."2 1 7 Moreover, the Court disposes of Turner by pointing out that Rogers,
the party bringing the contempt action, was not the state, but rather an unre-
presented private litigant to whom Turner owed child support. The Court spe-
cifically noted:
We do not address civil contempt proceedings where the underlying
child support payment is owed to the State, for example, for reim-
bursement of welfare funds paid to the parent with custody. Those
proceedings more closely resemble debt-collection proceedings. The
government is likely to have counsel or some other competent repre-
sentative. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) ("[T]he av-
erage defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel" (emphasis added)). And this kind of proceeding is not
before us. Neither do we address what due process requires in an un-
usually complex case where a defendant can fairly be represented only
by a trained advocate. 218
The implications of this passage for immigration detainees are clear. In immi-
gration detention proceedings, an attorney always presents the government's
case. More importantly, determining whether an individual is a flight risk or a
potential danger to the community is complex, a point Congress itself ac-
quiesced to in providing attorneys to pretrial detainees held according to those
same governmental interests. 9
Similarly, the government must bear the burden of persuasion in justifying
immigration detention. As with the provision of counsel, there is no principled
justification to deviate from the normal presumption against detention22 0 when
reviewing confinement incident to immigration proceedings. The government
traditionally bears the burden in habeas proceedings that attack detention;22 1
several courts of appeals have already held that the government has the burden
of persuasion in habeas challenges to immigration detention.2 2 2 Moreover, the
217. Id.
218. Id. (internal quotation marks and some internal citations omitted).
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (2012); cf United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751
(1987) (noting, in upholding the Bail Reform Act, hat the provision of counsel is a
procedural safeguard).
220. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.").
221. This applies when a habeas proceeding is conducted under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as op-
posed to a post-conviction habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
222. See infra notes 241-254 and accompanying text.
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preventive detention cases require the government to meet a heightened burden
of proof before any court can order civil confinement.2 3 The Constitution's
aversion to detention without sufficient process demands that immigration de-
tainees be treated no differently than other subjects of regulatory detention.
Given the limited scope of Turner and the potentially lengthy course of
immigration detention, there is no principled reason to accord immigration de-
tainees fewer rights in challenging their regulatory detention than pretrial,2 4
juvenile," and mental health detainees."' Judicial review of administrative
immigration detention decisions must occur in an Article III proceeding at
which counsel is provided to the detainee and the government bears the burden
of showing the individual is either a flight risk or potentially dangerous to socie-
ty.
V. CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Zadvydas opened the door to limited judicial review of immigration deten-
tion.2 2 7 In response to Zadvydas, the courts of appeals have had to grapple with
critical questions surrounding the scope of review, leading to a circuit split on
questions such as picking an appropriate forum and determining the scope of
review. In this Part, I analyze the resulting circuit split among the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, and then compare the law in
these circuits with the constitutionalized theory of immigration detention that I
advanced above."
Central to the circuit split are several regulations that the INS hastily
promulgated shortly after Zadvydas in an effort to limit the scope of that deci-
sion.22 9 The regulations created a system of administrative review230 that takes
place largely outside the jurisdiction of the immigration courts and entirely out-
side the jurisdiction of the federal courts."' Under the regulations, DHS officials
223. E.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (overturning a civil commitment
order where an individual was not "entitled to an adversary hearing at which the
State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is demonstrably danger-
ous to the community" (emphasis added)).
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
225. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1967).
226. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997) (evaluating the constitutionality
of a Kansas civil commitment statute).
227. For a discussion of Zadvydas, see supra Section I.C.
228. These are not the only circuits to interpret Zadvydas, but these circuits' conclu-
sions are broadly representative of the spectrum of post-Zadvydas litigation in the
lower courts.
229. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.1, 241-13, 241.14 (2012).
230. Id.
231. See id. § 241-14(a)(2).
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begin to consider a detainee's case "prior to the expiration of the removal pe-
riod.""' If removal remains foreseeable, DHS continues to detain the individu-
al."' If removal is not foreseeable, the government asks if there are various
"special circumstances," which may include certain criminal convictions, that
might justify continued detention.3 4 The regulations purport to authorize the
government to continue the detention of any person presenting "special cir-
cumstances" and do not contemplate any review of that detention beyond that
provided by DHS.
The Tenth Circuit, in Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, deferred to the
post-Zadvydas regulations, permitting the government to order immigration
detention without any judicial supervision. 35 The Hernandez-Carrera Court re-
versed a district court's grant of a habeas petition for Santiago Hernandez Are-
nado, who had been detained for over a decade pursuant to Sec-
tion 1231(a)(6).3 Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge McConnell held that the
government's interpretation of the statutes was entitled to Chevron deference,
specifically finding that the post-Zadvydas regulations are reasonable interpre-
tations of Section 1231(a)(6). 3 7 The Tenth Circuit relied on National Cable &
Telecommunication Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Services,38 which held that agen-
cies have the authority to interpret statutes in a manner inconsistent with pre-
vious court decisions so long as the last-in-time agency interpretation is a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute.' 9 The Tenth Circuit found Zadvydas had
interpreted an ambiguous statute, and, because the new regulations were rea-
sonable and not constitutionally suspect, they were entitled to deference. 240
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, has held that the post-Zadvydas regulations
are due no deference. In Diouf v. Napolitano,4' the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the nearly twenty-three-month detention of Amadou Diouf was unrea-
sonable under Zadvydas. As discussed earlier in this Note, the government de-
232. Id. § 24 1.4 (h)(1).
233. Id. § 241.3, 241.13.
234. Id. § 241-14.
235. 547 F.3d 1237 (1oth Cir. 2008).
236. Brief for Appellees at 1-8, Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (loth Cir.
20o8) (No. o8-3097), 20o8 WL 2964463 at *1-8.
237. 547 F.3d at 1246.
238. 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
239. Id. In other words, a court's interpretation of the statute is definitive only if it in-
terprets the statute at Chevron step one. If a reviewing court moves onto Chevron
step two and interprets a statute, an agency is later entitled to provide a differing
interpretation of the same statute so long as it is reasonable. Id.
24o. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F-3d at 1256.
241. 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011).
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tained Diouf after entry of a removal order. 42 Judge Fisher, writing for the pan-
el, noted that Chevron deference is unavailable "to DHS regulations interpreting
Section 1231(a)(6) . .. if they raise grave constitutional doubts," and so declined
to defer to the post-Zadvydas regulations. 43 To avoid a head-on collision with
the regulations, the Diouf court held that "the DHS regulations are appropriate
but not alone sufficient to address the serious constitutional concerns raised by
continued detention" 2 " because "the private interests at stake are profound." 45
This language permits the Ninth Circuit to require more process prior to per-
mitting prolonged detention under Section 1231(a)(6).
The Ninth Circuit turned to the famous three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge
test'4 and ordered the government to provide Diouf a bond hearing before an
immigration judge and an opportunity to appeal the immigration judge's de-
termination to the BIA.2 47 The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant
the habeas petition "unless the government establishes that the alien poses a risk
of flight or a danger to the community" in a hearing before an immigration
judge.24' The Ninth Circuit's approach to the case is not to allow the federal
court to review the noncitizen's detention directly, but rather to supervise addi-
tional administrative process not contemplated by the post-Zadvydas regula-
tions. 49
242. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
243. Diouf, 634 F.3d at io9o; see id. (quoting Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1105
n.15 (9th Cir. 2001)) ("Although we recognize that, in general, the Attorney Gen-
eral's interpretation of the immigration laws is entitled to substantial def-
erence . . . Chevron principles are not applicable where a substantial constitutional
question is raised by an agency's interpretation of a statute it is authorized to con-
strue.").
244. Id. at 1091.
245. Id. at 1092- see also id. at 1087 (stating that an "important interest is at stake-
freedom from prolonged detention").
246. Id. at 1090-91 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
247. Id. at 1092; see id. at 1091 (quoting Casas Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942, 951 (9th
Cir. 20o8)). That the Ninth Circuit was ordering a hearing in Dioufs case is a fic-
tion; the agency had already released Diouf from custody. Id. at 1084. The Ninth
Circuit specifically held that the case was not moot on the voluntary cessation
doctrine. Id. at 1084 n.3.
248. Id. at 1092. These factors depart from the Zadvydas standard, which looked only to
the foreseeability of actual removal from the United States and not to characteris-
tics of the individual.
249. The Ninth Circuit has held that "a federal district court has habeas jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review bond hearing determinations for constitutional
claims and legal error." Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9 th Cir. 2011). This
language implies that a habeas court in the Ninth Circuit does not review factual
determinations or take new evidence.
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The Fifth Circuit goes a step further than the Ninth Circuit and layers judi-
cial process on top of the DHS regulations and the administrative review con-
templated in Diouf In Tran v. Mukasey, Judge Stewart upheld a district court's
decision to grant habeas relief to Ha Tran, a mentally ill refugee convicted of
manslaughter after killing his wife in the presence of their seven-year-old
child.25 According no deference to the BIA, which had ordered Tran's contin-
ued detention, the district court ruled that the government could not show that
removal to Tran's native Vietnam was foreseeable, and therefore further immi-
gration detention was unjustified. The Tran court took a stronger stance than
either the Ninth or Tenth Circuits by endorsing the district court's direct, de
novo review of Tran's six-year detention that followed his removal order. 'I1
The Tran court held that the post-Zadvydas DHS regulations were imper-
missible constrictions of Section 1231(a)(6). On this point, Tran offers little
analysis; the panel mentioned Chevron only in passing and failed to discuss
Brand X at all.' Though it does not explicitly invoke the Chevron two-step
process, the Fifth Circuit relied on the fact that the Supreme Court had twice
considered the meaning of Section 1231(a)(6) and "twice held that Section
1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention for any class of aliens."5 3
Taking that interpretation as the definitive construction of the statute, the Fifth
Circuit permitted the court below to grant habeas relief to Tran. In other words,
the Fifth Circuit understood Zadvydas to be interpreting Section 1231(a)(6) at
Chevron step one, foreclosed further agency interpretation of the statute, and
permitted the immigration detainee to litigate directly in the district court.5 4
The circuit split highlights different conceptions of the proper role of the
federal judiciary in reviewing immigration detention, and each decision shows
250. 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit has also determined that the district
courts, and not EOIR, should hold the post-Zadvydas hearing. Ly v. Hansen, 351
F.3d 263, 272-73 (2003). Several district courts have also directly granted habeas re-
lief. E.g., Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455 (D. Mass. 2010); MO-
nestime v. Reilly, 704 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
251. The Tenth Circuit had not handed down Hernandez-Carrera at the time of Tran.
The Ninth Circuit had not handed down Diouf either, but had essentially arrived
at the Diouf holding in Thai v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004). Tran ex-
pressly adopts the logic of Thai. Tran, 515 F.3d at 483.
252. See id. The Fifth Circuit's failure to grapple with Brand X and ordinary principles
of administrative law more generally may be traced to the government's briefs,
which fail to mention Brand X and contain only a cursory analysis of administra-
tive law. See Brief for Petitioner, Tran 515 F-3d 478, (No. o6-30361) 20o6 WL
5721813 (failing to mention Brand X).
253. Tran, 515 F-3d at 484. The Supreme Court's second consideration of Section
1231(a)(6) occurred in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). In Zadvydas, the
Court limited its holding that Section 1231(a)(6) does not authorize prolonged de-
tention of noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States. The Clark
Court extended Zadvydas to apply to any noncitizen described by the statute.
254. See Tran, 515 F.3d at 484.
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the limitations of the plenary power doctrine in the immigration detention con-
text. The Tenth Circuit's reliance on regular principles of administrative law
conforms to the plenary power doctrine by permitting the government to exer-
cise virtually unfettered discretion to detain noncitizens with valid removal or-
ders. The Ninth Circuit has limited the role of the federal judiciary to the super-
vision of the administrative process, rather than providing a fundamentally fair
proceeding within the Article III system. The Fifth Circuit, which has effectively
adopted the de novo review I advocate for in Part IV, continues to judge the le-
gality of detention by reference to the foreseeability of the detainee's removal, a
criterion decoupled from the legitimate governmental aims advanced by the
immigration detention system. Instead of adopting one of these models, a con-
stitutionalized theory of immigration detention would employ the Fifth Cir-
cuit's procedural safeguards-the standard of review and burden of persua-
sion-and the Ninth Circuit's inquiry into dangerousness and flight risk.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this Note, I have aimed to develop and justify a constitution-
alized theory of immigration detention. Such a system differs in some signifi-
cant respects from our current plenary power-inspired administrative system by
providing for true review of immigration detention decisions in fundamentally
fair, Article III court proceedings.
While I have articulated a substantive theory of a constitutionalized immi-
gration detention system, I have not suggested an appropriate agent of change
for the reforms I present. Despite triumphant references to the federal courts as
protectors of individual liberty, 55 I acknowledge that the courts are often insti-
tutionally constrained from effecting systemic reforms, such as altering vast, na-
tional administrative adjudication systems. Rather than the courts, it is Con-
gress that has a primary role to play in immigration detention reform." While
proposals for comprehensive immigration reform have remained stalled in the
legislative process, President Obama and several prominent Republicans have
signaled a renewed interest in enacting meaningful, comprehensive immigra-
tion reform.2 57 The sheer magnitude of the immigration detention system, the
255. See, e.g., supra note 197.
256. By way of example, the expansion of due process in the veterans' benefits and tax
adjudication contexts was established by Congress without judicial intervention.
See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Brian Bennett, Obama Expects Immigration Reform "Very Soon" After In-
auguration, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics
/la-pn-obama-immigration-reform-inauguration-201214,o,3758450.story (quot-
ing President Obama as "very confident we can get immigration reform done");
Melanie Mason, Schumer, Graham Bringing Back Immigration Reform Plan, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-schumer
-graham-immigration-reform-201211,o,6619152.StOry; Jeremy B. White, Another
Republican for Immigration Reform: McCain, INT'L Bus. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 2012,
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Supreme Court's failure to apply the standards of its regulatory detention juris-
prudence to immigration detention, and the importance of ensuring that the
nation's immigration policy is implemented via "constitutionally permissible
means" demand that Congress consider reforming the immigration detention




258. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983).

